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Thomas Friedman has argued in The World is Flat that those who deny rapid globalization 
will not survive in the global economy. First, we critically discuss Friedman’s views and 
highlight the new globalization driven by outsourcing and vertical specialization. Second, we 
argue that Friedman pays insufficient attention to the spectacular growth of mega-cities in the 
developing world. The world is not flat, and the developing world certainly is not. Still, mega-
cities tend to become too big. Their growth also goes hand in hand with formation of slums 
and congestion. We thus argue that there is a role for public policies.  
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I benefited from the discussions resulting from chairing a lively public debate with Thomas 
Friedman on The World is Flat on 4 June, 2007 in The Passenger Terminal Amsterdam 
organized by SEO and Delta Lloyd.   1
Globalization combined with the advent of the Internet and the accompanying revolutions in 
communications technology have transformed the world. Numerous newspaper articles document the 
effects of outsourcing, in-sourcing, off-sourcing and many other phenomena that have increased global 
competition in recent decades. It is fair to say that many citizens feel threatened by these 
developments. But many of the routine, low-skilled jobs have already moved to countries with 
abundant cheap labour. Many of the higher skilled jobs ranging from teachers, accountants, computer 
programmers and technical drawers to radiologists are now also threatened by outsourcing. Thomas 
Friedman in his influential book The World is Flat argues forcefully that the world has changed 
forever and that those who fail to adapt and specialize and develop specific skills will find their 
Waterloo in the harsh global competition with countries like India and China. Compete or perish 
seems to be lesson from reading this book. Still, many economists feel uncomfortable with much of 
the arguments offered by Friedman. 
Our aim is to first present a brief review and critique of the thesis on globalization, 
digitalization and the ensuing revolutions for workers, consumers and firms put forward by Thomas 
Friedman in his book The World is Flat. We then explain that most of Friedman’s arguments derive 
from the so-called second unbundling of tasks within factories and offices. Globalization and the 
ensuing global competition increasingly takes place task by task rather than sector by sector or firm by 
firm. In view of the rapid urbanization of especially developing countries and the arrival of mega-
cities, we argue that the metaphor The World is Flat is misleading as people and firms benefit so much 
from being humped together. In fact, mega-cities tend to become too large from a social perspective 
and attract too much labour from rural areas, especially in developing countries. We also argue that the 
process of urbanization and development can and should be aided with public policies, such as public 
infrastructures and public education, if slums, congestion and other negative side effects are to be 
avoided. We want to make clear at the outset that our paper is a critical and eclectic appraisal of 
Friedman’s influential work, which is directed at political scientists, geographers and public policy 
scholars as much as at professional economists. It is an essay which makes use of insights from the 
available literature on international trade, development economics and urban economics to gain new 
insights on the issues of globalization, urbanization and the rise of mega-cities. 
 
The organization of our paper is as follows. Part I constitutes the first half of the paper and deals with 
the globalization aspects of Friedman’s arguments. Section I.1 tries to get to grip with the main theses 
of Friedman’s The World is Flat and argues that, despite the undeniable trends towards globalization 
and digitalization, many of the knowledge-intensive jobs in the Western world are not contested by 
outsourcing and low-wage labour from the developing world. Buyers and sellers have indeed become 
more footloose, but cities surprisingly offer many advantages of agglomeration. Neither have wages in 
the Western and developing world converged. Most of international trade is with neighbouring 
countries, so that the “death of distance” is not a helpful metaphor. Section I.2 highlights the second   2
unbundling, which amounts to fragmentation of production and outsourcing of individual tasks within 
the production process. This contrasts with the first unbundling of consumption and production, which 
was mainly driven by lower transport and communication costs. Now most of the unbundling concerns 
the off-shoring of mundane, codifiable tasks across many different sectors, so that the losers of 
globalization are much harder to identify. Compared with the normal creation and destruction of jobs, 
outsourcing is still pretty insignificant. Yet, there is evidence that it depresses wages of the low skilled 
and boosts wages of the higher skilled workers. Growing inequality is thus a phenomenon of the 
recent waves of globalization. 
Before policy conclusions can be discussed, the second part of this paper draws out the 
relationships between globalization and urbanization in the global economy. Section II.1 discusses the 
rapid urbanization in the world economy. Half the people on this planet now live in cities and the 
degree of urbanization increases especially in the developing world. Cities attract increasing numbers 
of people from the country side. This has led to a rapid increase in mega-cities with more than ten 
million inhabitants. Section II.2 takes a developing economies perspective and discusses the merits of 
urbanization and mega-cities. Section II.3 gives the bare bones of a theory of optimal city size, which 
balances agglomeration advantages and congestion costs. Section II.4 then makes the case that many 
of the African mega-cities have not enjoyed the fruits of globalization. In contrast to the Asian policies 
directed at balanced urban growth and avoidance of too few and too large cities, Africa suffers from 
the problem of primacy and stagnating mega-cities. This may be due to trade restrictions that favour 
manufacturing and service activities, political favouritism, excessive number of slums and high rents 
in the informal housing market in African cities. 
The third part of the paper wraps up. Section III.1 offers policy recommendations for, on the 
one hand, balanced urbanization to ensure development of a variety of cities and avoid urban primacy, 
and, on the other hand, social policies to offset the harmful effects of globalization. Section III.2 wraps 
up with some concluding remarks.  
 
 
PART I: GLOBALIZATION 
  
I.1. Globalization, Digitalization and Is the World Really Flat? 
 
Globalization has been driven by the falling costs of transport and communication ever since the 
introduction of steamships, railroads and the telegraph as described so vividly in Standage (1998) on 
the ‘Victorian Internet’. To put it another way, the engine of globalization has been steady reductions 
in the costs of moving goods, capital, people and ideas. Recent technology improvements have had 
huge measurable effects. The real costs of moving goods between US cities dropped by over 90 
percent during the 20
th century, according to Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004), when road transportation   3
started to replace water and railway transportation. During the second half of the same century the cost 
of air transportation has dropped as well (Hummel, 2008). During the two world wars and the Great 
Depression the ugly head of protectionism reared its head. Since World War II many trade barriers and 
the costs of transport have fallen with the advent of modern airlines and mass tankers. Most 
dramatically, with the extremely rapid development of email and the Internet, the costs of 
communication have fallen. This has prompted many to argue that the world has become a “global 
village” and to argue with slogans like “the death of distance”. Friedman (2007) has used it to fuel his 
metaphor of “The World is Flat”. His views have become very influential in policy making circles and 
with the general public, but have been criticized at length by academic economists. Birdsall (2005) 
argues that the world is far from flat, since many unequal opportunities persist at the level of 
households within countries and at the level of nations and the forces of globalization seem to 
exacerbate these inequalities. The most detailed and coherent economic critique of Friedman’s book is 
probably due to Leamer (2007). Leamer has some problems deciphering the blurb of Friedman’s book: 
  “..the convergence of technology and events that allowed India, China, and so many other 
countries to become part of the global supply chain for services and manufacturing, 
creating an explosion of wealth in the middle classes of the world’s two biggest nations 
and giving them a huge new stake in the success of globalization? And with this 
“flattening” of the globe, which requires us to run faster in order to stay in the same 
place, has the world gotten too small and too fast for human beings and their political 
systems to adjust in a stable manner?” 
Just as Columbus’ discovered the Indian natives in America, Friedman found that the Indian people in 
Bangalore were American in name and speech and business practices. This is where Friedman had his 
flash of insight that The World is Flat. Friedman discusses ten forces that “flatten” the world: (1) the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; (2) the birth of the Internet in 1995 with the going public of Netscape; 
(3) work flow software to coordinate tasks; (4) open-sourcing (e.g., Linux or Wikipedia); (5) 
outsourcing (e.g., mundane and increasingly more sophisticated coding of software from the US to 
Bangalore, routine and labour-intensive drawings of architect plans, call centres); (6) off-shoring 
manufacturing jobs to developing countries with low wages; (7) supply chains (e.g., Wal-Mart or DAF 
buses); (8) in-sourcing (e.g., UPS picking up and fixing your laptop); (9) in-forming (e.g., Google); 
and (10) the so-called “steroids” (mobile internet, videoconferencing, etc.). Undoubtedly, these ten 
forces have and are transforming the world, but have they “flattened” (whatever that means) the 
world? Leamer (2007) argues that the huge increase in unskilled workers due to the opening up of 
China, India, Russia and South America is just as important a force in the march towards progress. 
The advent of Internet and the resulting disappearance of helpers and middlemen, and the spurt in 
communication innovations have made it possible for people to focus on inspiration rather than 
perspiration, not a mean feat. And with the Internet it is possible to order goods and services from all 
parts in the world. This has expanded the set of consumption opportunities, reduced monopoly power   4
and lowered costs. In some cases, the new technology has fundamentally altered how business is done 
(think of the music industry). Most important, the new ICT technologies have greatly improved the 
opportunities for exchange and thus made possible a further division of labour and huge improvements 
in efficiency along the lines discussed by Adam Smith in his An Inquire Into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations more than two and a quarter centuries ago. 
Although these latter trends could be seen to flatten the world, Leamer (2007) and many others 
have problems understanding what is meant by the world is “flat” from the perspective of traditional 
theories of economic geography. The old Von Thünen and Hotelling models suggest that geography 
constrains competition and creates long-term relationships between buyers and sellers. Farm land is 
sold at a premium near the city centre to reflect lower transportation costs and thus crops with a high 
value added are produced closer to the centre of the market town. Christaller’s classical (1933) theory, 
extended and modified by  Lösch (1938), of minimizing the average distance between consumer and 
supply point cuts a never-ending featureless plane into equal-sized hexagons with supply points 
located at the centre of each hexagon, but does not seem compatible with The World is Flat metaphor 
either. Leamer (2007) concludes that geography creates cost-advantaged relationships between sellers 
and buyers who are located “close” to one another. Economic geography is not concerned with “What 
if the world is flat rather than bumpy?” but with “How do lower transportation costs affect competition 
and regional inequalities?”. It makes more sense to argue that falling costs of transport and 
communication and global networks of knowledge have made the world “smaller”, so that buyers and 
sellers become more footloose and competition is more intense. Still, economic geography matters 
(think of Hollywood and Bollywood for films, Silicon Valley for electronic innovations, Manhattan 
and the City of London for finance, clothing in Prato, Italy, or the flower exchange market in the 
Netherlands, etc.). Buyers and sellers like to deal with others they know and trust. Such long-run 
relationships are key to trade and are not easy to break by far-away low-skilled workers.  
Leamer (2007) argues convincingly that many of Friedman’s arguments are flawed. Many of 
the most knowledge-intensive jobs are not contested by outsourcing, since experts want to live and 
work in the same area in order to learn and profit from each other. The fears that much of their work is 
commoditized and sold in global markets and that wages in the North will be set by the abundance of 
workers in the South are simply unjustified. Friedman’s claim that, not only routine tasks, but also 
secure, negotiable higher skilled jobs will be transformed into insecure contestable jobs does not ring a 
bell either. Not all products will be standardized and priced accordingly, but prices of customized, 
specialized goods will be negotiated and the markets for those goods are likely to be contested by 
global competition. In fact, much of the production of apparel, leather products, fabricated metal 
products and electrical equipment, appliances and components has already moved to developing 
countries and thus there are not many jobs left to be contested in those sectors. Other sectors such as 
the professional finance and insurance sectors or the motion pictures are specialized and rely on 
agglomeration externalities, so jobs in those sectors are less likely to be contested by global   5
competition. Of course, the mobility of ideas and transfer of knowledge has increased enormously 
with the globalization and digitalization of the economy. This offers parts of India and China genuine 
opportunities to set up their own Silicon Valley and Hollywood. Researchers want to hump together in 
order to be creative and productive and ideas can be quite footloose, so it makes more sense to 
subsidize higher education than to subsidize R&D. There may also be reasons to make cities more 
attractive to the creative class by having a rich cultural climate as argued by Florida (2005). The key 
insight is that mainly jobs or tasks that are mundane and codifiable are contested by global 
competition. 
The main problem is that much of Friedman’s thesis is based on informal discussions with key 
players in the global economy without a proper and detailed analysis of the statistical facts of 
globalization. Leamer (2007) points out that the global income distribution has not become flatter, 
neither between countries nor within the US (and most other Western countries). The Great 
Equalization of factor incomes, where wages and per capita incomes in the poorest part of the world 
rise dramatically towards those in the richest part of the world has not occurred (yet). India and China 
have made immense progress during the last twenty years, but the US, Japan and some other rich 
countries have grown very fast as well. Many of the other middle-income countries that initially 
managed to attract low-wage manufacturing jobs from the high-wage countries have lost ground to 
China and India. People in different parts of the globe are not identical and are not performing the 
same tasks. For example, the few agricultural workers that are left in the rich countries typically have 
access to very expensive and efficient machinery for planting, cultivating and harvesting, whereas a lot 
of this work in the poorest country is done by hand. 
Contrary to what many advocates of the “death of distance” claim, empirical gravity equations 
suggest that international trade is much stronger between countries that are geographically close (and 
large). Indeed, most of trade of EU is intra-European. In that sense, the world is not flat and the 
dramatic falls in transportation and communication costs has not made the world flatter either. The 
surge in Asian products sold in the US and Europe is due to the rapid economic growth in China and 
India, not due to the “death of distance”. Much of the buzz of economic activity is due to face-to-face 
contact as shown by Storper and Venables (2004). This is an efficient means of communication, it 
promotes socialization and learning, and provides better incentives and psychological motivation, 
especially when information is imperfect, changing rapidly and not easily codified. Astonishingly, 
Blum and Goldfarb (2006) show that US Internet users favour foreign websites close to the US and 
thus geographic proximity determines action on the Internet as well. As forcefully argued by Bhagwati 
(2004) and many other economists, the wage of an individual worker depends on education, 
experience, talent but also on where he or she lives and works. Leamer (2007) argues that the decline 
in manufacturing jobs is only affected a small amount by international trade. Outsourcing of 
intellectual work is actually very small (and much smaller than is hyped in the press) and the US is 
extremely well placed to compete in the Internet-segment of the economy. Leamer (2007) makes clear   6
that not more than a few percentage points of jobs are off-shored each year, which is a mere fraction of 
the number of jobs being destroyed and created each year. This is not surprising given that bilateral 
trade in goods decreases by about 9 percent for every 10 percent increase in distance; an effect that has 
not diminished during the last half a century according to Disdier and Head (2008). This might be due 
to more than transportation costs, for example due to culture. Moreover, since off-shoring requires 
tasks to be delivered down the Internet, they have to becodifiable and require little face-to-face 
interaction. Many jobs (of, say, barbers, taxi drivers, nurses or schoolteachers) are simply not affected. 
In sum, although The World is Flat is a persuasive metaphor backed up by plenty of interesting 
anecdotes, its main thesis does not seem to stand up to the facts. However, recent work by Geishecker 
and Görg (2007), using a large household panel and detailed industry level data, on industries’ 
outsourcing activities does find a significant effect of outsourcing on wages. A one percent increase in 
outsourcing reduces the wage of the lowest skilled workers by 1.5 percent whereas it increases the 
wage of the highest skilled workers by 2.6 percent. Globalization has thus increased income inequality 
between low skilled and high skilled workers. 
 
I.2. The Second Unbundling: Globalization, Outsourcing and Fragmentation 
 
To gain better insights into the phenomenon of globalization and the thesis put forward in The World 
is Flat, it helps to follow Baldwin and Martin (1999) and distinguish two types of unbundling in the 
process of globalization. We base much of the discussion in this section on Baldwin (2006). The first 
type of unbundling was driven by falling transport and communication costs and took place during the 
years 1850-1914. Effectively, it was no longer necessary to make goods close to the point where 
consumption takes place. It was driven by industrialization of the US and Western Europe (the North 
and de-industrialization of India and China (the South), an explosion of international trade in goods 
and factors of production, and a rapid and historically unprecedented urbanization in the North. This 
first unbundling was accompanied by stagnating incomes per capita in the South and rapid growth in 
the North, thus leading to a massive divergence between incomes in the North and South. The second 
unbundling took off in the 1960s and shows marked differences with the first unbundling. The South 
(East Asia) has been and is industrializing rapidly while the North continues to de-industrialize and 
shift from manufacturing to services.  
After the return to protectionism set off by two world wars and the Great Depression, the 
second unbundling saw a rapid liberalization of trade and capital flows. Together with the rapid falls 
in communication and coordination costs, this has led to a big wave in vertical specialization and off-
shoring of service-sector jobs. Whereas the first unbundling implied a spatial separation of factories 
and consumers, the second unbundling led to a spatial unpacking of factories and offices themselves 
and a slicing up of the value-added chain as argued by Baldwin (2006). The fragmentation 
characteristic of the second unbundling wave of globalization has resulted in spectacular growth in the   7
industrializing giants China and India (four or five times faster than during the Industrial Revolution) 
and a modest slowdown of growth in the North. Although India and China seem to be catching up, 
many of the middle-income countries are loosing ground to India and China and their growth rates are 
trailing behind those of the US and Japan as well as of China and India. The growth during the second 
unbundling was accompanied by further rapid urbanization, especially in China and India. However, 
the experience of Africa indicates that urbanization does not always go hand in hand with higher 
growth in income per capita (see Section II.2). Interestingly, inequalities in income and unemployment 
outcomes increased substantially in the North. 
Available theories of international trade go a long way towards understanding the first 
unbundling. International trade in goods and migration has led to more efficient outcomes and static 
and dynamic gains of trade. Globalization has also led to expanding markets and exploitation of scale 
economies in the production of manufactured goods. There are also strong forces that boost spatial 
clustering. People and firms settle in big cities in search of better jobs, the need for face-to-face 
interaction, and the stimulation of the buzz of learning from each other. They do this despite high costs 
of commuting or of living in the cities and despite congestion and air pollution. But the agglomeration 
forces operating due to globalization and the desire to be close to consumers and suppliers (leading to 
demand side or forward and supply side or backward linkages) operate on a much larger geographic 
scale and span many countries. They result in dense networks of suppliers, manufacturers and 
infrastructure and set in motion a process of cumulative causation. Since under autarky production is 
necessarily bundled with consumption and under completely free trade (i.e., no tariffs, no transport 
costs, etc.) location of production is irrelevant, the forces of agglomeration are strongest at 
intermediate degrees of trade and transport costs. This hump-shaped feature of agglomeration explains 
why cities grew so much in the North during 1850-1914 and in the South from the 1960s onwards. 
Agglomeration advantages are further fuelled by Paul Krugman’s home market effect (1980). 
Effectively, returns to scale and imperfect competitiongive large national markets a disproportionate 
share of world industry, because market-access (expenditure) advantages outweigh market-crowding 
disadvantages. Firms want to locate near their consumers. Still, firms do not locate all in the same 
place as local competition (due to trade costs providing protection against competition from firms 
elsewhere) is strongest in the biggest market. The home market effect is magnified through freer trade 
when production becomes more footloose, while expenditure from locally earned wages is still mainly 
spent locally. A larger market will then attract even more industry (Krugman, 1991).  
  
The losers of the first wave of globalization could be helped by specific compensation to the 
most adversely affected sectors, workers and firms, and by retraining wherever possible the displaced 
work force. Sectors, not tasks, were hurt by the falling cost of trading goods rather than of trading 
ideas during the first unbundling. The sectors in the US and Europe with the lowest comparative 
advantage on international markets were unable to compete with cheap labour abroad at prevailing   8
wage levels even if wages fell to the level of welfare/unemployment benefits. These sectors thus 
perished. With falling trade costs, the sectors with the highest comparative advantage  benefit while  
sectors with the lowest comparative advantage (including the sectors constrained by the severest form 
of labour market regulation) would be hurt most. This is more or less what happened to textiles, 
electrical products and other manufacturing sectors relying on low-skilled labour in Europe during the 
first unbundling. The winners of the first wave of globalization in the rich countries were thus the 
high-skilled workers and the losers the low-skilled and unskilled workers. The richer high-skilled 
workers are also the ones that applaud immigration of cheap low-skilled workers. At the same time, 
unskilled workers are hurt which explains the upsurge of populist anti-immigration sentiments among 
the traditional working classes in much of Europe. There has been a steady fall in the number of 
routine tasks to be performed and an increase in the upgrading of skills, which is great as it offers 
ample opportunities for technical progress. The policy response (e.g., witness the Lisbon Agenda) has 
been to put (mostly in rhetoric) education on top of the political agenda and to attempt to shift towards 
an “information society”. But it is not clear that it is so easy to predict winners and losers during the 
second wave as it was during the first wave of globalization. 
To get a better grasp of the second unbundling, we need to disaggregate beyond the level of an 
individual firm and depart from the idea that all production stages are spatially clustered in a single 
plant or office. The first unbundling benefited skill-intensive sectors, but damaged the position of 
unskilled, labour-intensive sectors in the North. The second unbundling introduced global competition 
into factories and offices on a task-by-task rather than a firm-by-firm or sector-by-sector basis and has 
led to international trade in tasks rather than trade in goods and services as argued by Blinder (2006) 
and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). It is this revolution which is transforming much of the 
world today and has been highlighted dramatically by Friedman’s The World is Flat. A telling 
example of the second unbundling is the explosion in the 1980s of Japanese companies that off-shored 
labour-intensive production stages to cheaper, nearby East Asian countries. Apparently, the 
productivity advantage of Japan over China and its neighbours more than justified the Japan-China 
wage gap. Consequently, there was no fall in industrial employment in Japan. The off-shoring made 
Japan, in fact, more competitive in the US and European markets. Baldwin (2006) talks of the 
“hollowing out” of the Japanese economy and of East Asia splitting up in head-quarter economies 
(Japan later followed by the Asian Tigers) and factory economies. Another telling example of the 
second unbundling is the off-shoring of previously non-traded tasks such as call centres in the US and 
UK to India. The second unbundling has been extended to intermediate goods and services. 
  The second unbundling involved the off-shoring of mundane, codifiable tasks (e.g., data entry 
or bookkeeping) across a diverse variety of labour- and capital-intensive sectors, so that it is not 
possible to identify winners and losers from globalization according to the sectors they work in or 
even the skill group they belong to. It thus makes sense to rank tasks rather than sectors according to 
comparative advantage and competitiveness. But some tasks (e.g., reception services, protection   9
services or driving a truck) are hardly affected by reduced costs of communication, coordination and 
transferring ideas, while other tasks (e.g., call centre services, software design) are very much affected. 
Now the winning and losing tasks of globalization are much tougher to predict due to the complex 
interactions with other tasks in each factory or office. Wages of many workers currently performing 
non-trading tasks in the developed countries are not justified by their productivity, so the second 
unbundling may threaten their income or their job. Coordination costs are convex, since it is better to 
have most people working together, whether it is in a call centre in Amsterdam or in Paramaribo. After 
a certain point, the balance is tipped and all call centre tasks are off-shored. The situation is thus 
complicated by the suddenness and unpredictability of off-shoring. The New Economic Geography 
highlights the agglomeration economies of backward and forward linkages in moving goods, people 
and ideas. The humpy nature of agglomeration economies also points to a critical mass in the process 
of development. Marginal changes can lead to sudden and large shifts in tasks. There has not been 
much off-shoring of financial services, but it may suddenly happen at a large scale. 
  Of course, the second unbundling corresponds in a real sense to technical progress because 
trade in intermediate goods and services implies that more output can be produced from the same 
inputs. Just like Luddites opposed the introduction of new technologies (e.g., newspapers were for 
some time set electronically as well as by hand to pacify the trade unions), many oppose fragmentation 
and the associated off-shoring. But off-shoring should be seen as a boon rather than a curse. In this 
sense, it is not very different from technical progress. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) suggest 
that the impact of off-shoring on wages, of say bookkeepers in the developed world, operates via the 
terms of trade, jobs and productivity: off-shoring to low-wage bookkeepers lowers the price of 
bookkeeping, which harms the real wage of bookkeepers in the developed world; also demand for 
bookkeepers in the developed world falls which lowers wages (or causes unemployment among 
bookkeepers) in the developed world; and workers in the developed world will focus on higher 
productivity activities which exerts upward pressure on wages. If the productivity effect dominates the 
terms of trade and jobs effects, then off-shoring of routine, manual tasks is a boon for society as it 
allows workers to concentrate on non-routine, more analytic tasks demanding face-to-face interactions, 
continual fine tuning and trust. This shift clearly boosts productivity, wages and morale. Indeed, 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) show that the share of non-routine tasks has increased while 
that of routine tasks has fallen in the US since 1970.  
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PART II: URBANIZATION 
 
II.1. Rapid Urbanization and the Growth of Mega-Cities in the Developing World 
 
Outsourcing, unbundling and fragmentation of firms has, however, not lead to general dispersion of 
activities across the globe. Many more countries now have stronger links with world trade even if they 
are far away from the major consumer markets of the EU and US. However, within these countries 
most activity is concentrated in a few metropolitan areas. We argue that rapid urbanization, especially 
in the developing world, has been one important feature that has developed rapidly in the wake of the 
waves of globalization and is overlooked by the supposed flatness of the world. Urbanization has been 
increasing around the world and has reached the 50 percent mark last year.
1 Half the world population 
thus lives together in cities rather than spread across the countryside. After describing the facts of 
urbanization in various parts of the world, the next sections look at the costs and opportunities of 
urbanization in the light of globalization. In particular, we explain why some mega-cities grow at very 
rapid rates and manage to reap the benefits of the new wave of globalization while other mega-cities 
grow very rapidly as well but suffer from high levels of underemployment and unemployment. Indeed, 
some mega-cities may be too large and suffer from slums, pollution and other congestion problems. 
Our main point is that, if urbanization is really a crucial feature of globalization, then The World is 
Flat metaphor seems difficult to swallow and at least misses some crucial aspects of globalization. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the progressive increase in urbanization across different 
geographical regions. Urbanization levels are high everywhere and are increasing very rapidly in the 
developing world. Fast growing regions such as East Asia and the Pacific are now as urbanized as 
Western Europe was in 1970. This roughly coincides with the average level of GDP per capita in East 
Asia and the Pacific reaching 1970 levels of Western Europe. Figure 1 indicates that urbanization and 
growth in GDP per capita go hand-in-hand as countries develop and transform themselves from a 
rural-agricultural structure to an urban-industrial economy. Industrial job creation in cities and the 
consequent prospect of a well-paid job is a powerful force for people to move from the countryside to 
urban centres. China placed itself at the receiving end of footloose manufacturing and has been able to 
put its massive population to use in cities, where industry has clustered to make use of agglomeration 
economies. The growing global demand for cheap labour has induced migration from rural areas to the 
coastal provinces, although partly government planned in the case of China (Au and Henderson, 
2006a). Urbanization is thus generally viewed as a transitory process that accompanies income and job 
growth (Henderson, 2004; Lucas, 2004). It is akin to the frontier expansion of the rapid development 
of the United States in the period before the industrial revolution (Barbier, 2006). Higher income 
countries are almost fully urbanized while less developed countries have much lower levels of 
                                                 
1 De facto population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria used by each area or country (United 
Nations, 2006).    11
urbanization. Figure 1, however, shows that urbanization can also occur without growth in income per 
capita, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa and also for some time in Latin America. Fay and Opal (2000) 
and Davis and Henderson (2003) explore the influence of government policies on shaping the 
concentration of people and industry in cities. Policies as tariffs, subsidies and price controls affect the 
sectoral composition through terms of trade effects between agriculture and modern industry and 
thereby tend to favour the urban manufacturing sectors.  
A high share of the national urban population living in the largest city is another phenomenon 
of mainly developing countries. Table 2 shows the degree of concentration of the urban population 
within countries. In 1995 a staggering 40 percent of the total urban population (25 percent of the total 
population) in Latin America lived in one single city. The same is true for Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
the level of concentration has been on the rise since at least 1960. Faster growing and definitely 
developed countries appear to have much lower levels of urban concentration and levels have been 
declining. Based on Williamson (1965), Davis and Henderson (2003) address this issue and find an 
inverted U-shaped relation between development and the concentration of urban inhabitants in a single 
city. The mechanisms through which this works are initially unequal growth within countries and 
subsequently other regions catching up. Unequal growth within countries is thus a clear sign that 
economic opportunities are better in a few concentrated places. 
Table 3 lists the largest cities in the world, namely those with over ten million inhabitants, and 
shows the fast pace of growth of these mega-cities in developing countries. In 1975 only Tokyo, New 
York-Newark and Mexico City had more than ten million inhabitants, but a quarter century later many 
cities in the developing world have joined the club of mega-cities. Apart from Los Angeles and Osaka-
Kobe, all new entrants in the rankings are all from less developed countries. São Paolo, Mumbai, 
Shanghai, Delhi, Kolkata, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Dhaka, Moscow, Karachi, Cairo, Manila, 
Lagos and Beijing have all surpassed the ten million inhabitants mark and more are expected to follow 
in the near future. 
Globalization may well have increased the returns from living with so many people clustered 
in one place. On the downside it poses enormous challenges in most relatively poor countries, since a 
big chunk of city growth is due to rapid growth in informal employment and informal housing (slums). 
Most of these new mega-cities are situated in fast growing Asia, but not exclusively. Table 4 also 
shows the big contrast between the largest cities and cities of other sizes. The yearly growth rates by 
city-size classification fluctuates as cities move up the scale, but the average across years clearly 
shows that population growth rates (both natural and in-migration) are much higher in the largest cities 
and also much higher in less developed countries. The fact that these trends coincide with 
globalization begs for a closer look. The growth rate of the population in smaller (or new) cities is also 
sizeable at 19 percent every 5 years. The next section examines the potential benefits of these 
agglomerations.  
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II.2. Benefits of Urbanization and Mega-Cities: a Developing Economies Perspective 
 
The benefits of cities consist of the agglomeration forces that attract firms and workers, which allow 
them to be more productive than they would have been on their own, or allows them to serve a larger 
local market. One reason on the production side for industry to concentrate, is to share inputs, which 
are either immobile, costly to replicate (e.g., infrastructure such as a harbour) or costly to transport.  
For example, traditionally production took place close to mines and currently close to research centres, 
in a cities like Boston, Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge, U.K.. If certain locations are endowed with a 
crucial input for production that cannot be replicated easily, then industries will seek out these 
locations. In that sense, globalization has made the market global and increased the number of 
production locations to choose from, depending on the type of task, because production need not take 
place close to market anymore.  
The growth of large agglomerations suggests that there is still a demand for local increasing 
returns to scale activities even though the often mentioned “death of distance” suggests that production 
might as well take place in the middle of nowhere. Lower transportation and communication costs 
allow a firm to choose a far-away location for its manufacturing. Yet, it will still choose a location 
with the right comparative advantage for its particular product and with the right infrastructure to be 
able to ship products to consumers. Typically, comparative advantage is strongest in cities, because in 
cities it is worthwhile to invest in infrastructure as the high costs can be spread over many people and 
firms. Comparative advantage may take the shape of a large pool of cheap labour, but can also take the 
shape of risk sharing as substitutes for suppliers may be found more easily in cities. Most suppliers are 
found in cities rather than in rural villages. These particular benefits are larger in mega-cities than in 
small cities. If urbanization takes the form of an expansion in the number of cities, then this may also 
increase the number of locations to choose from. Consequently, this allows better matching between 
firms and production locations. The unbundling of production processes has triggered an intensified 
search for the right location to produce. Each step on the way to a final product can now be produced 
in separate locations. Since this holds for many firms and products, similar tasks will end up clustered 
in the same area as close as possible to the ideal location. From there, lower transportation costs allow 
firms to reach the world market.  
A good location for a particular firm may become even better if other firms join the same 
agglomeration. Local increasing returns have many micro foundations as described in more detail in 
Duranton and Puga (2004) and summarized in Overman and Venables (2005) for the context of a 
developing country. A bigger concentration of firms allows access to greater product variety and 
greater specialization of each firm. Learning is easier if there are more firms to learn from. These 
benefits are referred to as thick goods markets. Entrepreneurs may find it easier to obtain finance and 
venture capital in a larger city. Furthermore, it is easier for firms to learn about and search for new 
technologies which they will do more intensively due to increased local competition.    13
Thickness also exists in the labour market. Firms can hire from a larger pool of workers 
allowing them to find a better match and find more specialized labour. This is in itself an incentive for 
workers to acquire those skills. A larger city may also provide such specialized labour in relative 
abundance, such as software engineers in Bangalore, making them cheap and competitive in the light 
of the second unbundling. Workers may also benefit from a larger market through labour poaching if 
firms bid up wages for strategic workers. Co-location may break down if competition becomes too 
intense. However, labour pooling benefits usually dominate (Combes and Duranton, 2006).  
A larger city allows better market access, which is composed of demand (or backward) 
linkages and cost (or forward) linkages. The first leads to clustering, since firms that supply other 
firms are drawn to the cluster. For example, a concentration of call centres can induce a supplier of 
educated workers (say, a school) to join the agglomeration. The latter implies that firms will also seek 
out a location close to their essential suppliers. These reinforcing agglomeration forces are stronger if 
transportation costs are high. Transportation costs not only include shipping costs, but in a broader 
sense include trust and the risk of losing critical technology to competitors that come with outsourcing. 
This distinction may explain the coexistence of long-haul transportation of goods and short-distance 
relation-based production in a few agglomerations. Public good provision is also realized more 
efficiently in a larger city, because the often large fixed costs of public infrastructure make more sense 
in a larger city. This not only improves quality of living, but may also have productivity enhancing 
effects. Better health of workers is often used as an argument for high efficiency wages in developing 
countries (Stiglitz, 1976). Wages could be lower and employment higher if such health care is publicly 
provided.  
Apart from the above static effects leading to increasing returns to scale, there are also 
dynamic effects in cities. Rodrik (2004) argues that development depends on a cost discovery process, 
that is entrepreneurs have to discover that a certain product may be produced more cheaply in the local 
city. The discovery arguably takes place with higher probability in a large city, also in developing 
countries. Hausman and Rodrik (2002) argue that such knowledge eventually becomes public and thus 
leads to local specialization in production as is often found in developing countries. This means that a 
nursery city argument as put forward by Duranton and Puga (2001) may also be relevant for 
developing countries (Overman and Venables, 2005). Diverse cities facilitate learning about the 
viability of new products, which are then produced in cities that have a comparative advantage to do 
so. More and larger cities (urbanization) create more locations with the associated opportunities for 
learning, production and trade. Taking this argument further, we dare say that urbanized countries are 
better positioned to reap the benefits of globalization than not-yet urbanized countries, both in the 
developed world (knowledge spill-overs) and in the developing world (manufacturing related spill-
overs). It thus pays to agglomerate, even in a flat globalizing world. This deserves more attention than 
is given in Friedman’s The World is Flat.   14
The benefit of cities for the location of firms naturally leads to the suggestion that cities and 
urbanizing countries form the preferred location for foreign direct investment (FDI). The empirical 
literature on FDI has not paid much attention yet to the role of urbanization explicitly, but there is 
evidence that factors typically found in cities play a role in attracting FDI. Noorbakhsh, Paloni and 
Youssef (2001) show that countries with high levels of human capital, buoyant labour growth and 
substantial international trade attract significantly more FDI (using a sample of 36 countries for the 
period 1980-94). All three of these factors can be found in relative abundance in cities. Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) find positive but weakly significant effects of urban-related variables (such as the urbanization 
rate, number of telephone lines and number of city lights) on FDI flows towards developing countries 
and Chinese provinces. Their data set is unfortunately relatively small (23 countries for the period 
1976-97 and 1996-98 for China). Noorbaksh, Paloni and Youssef (2001) recognize, however, that FDI 
can be directed towards resource extraction, although this was more relevant in the 1950s.
2 This is not 
an urban activity, but FDI flows have subsequently been directed towards locations with low labour 
costs and increasingly towards locations with educated labour. These factors appear more important 
than (local) market size in developing countries, which is consistent with FDI and export led growth. 
Au and Henderson (2006b) also stress the importance of local labour growth. The lack of migration 
limited sectoral agglomeration in China and weakened GDP growth. Agglomeration economies in turn 
feature as a core determinant of local firm activity (Baldwin et al, 2003) and may thus matter for FDI.  
Growth in Asia has taken off through low-skill and labour-intensive textile exports (the first 
unbundling). The question is why this has not yet happened in Africa, which also features access to a 
large and cheap pool of labour under rapid urbanization, especially as wages rise in Asia.  
Asia has clearly been most successful in tapping into the opportunities offered by 
globalization. For example, China has created special economic zones to attract foreign companies. 
Singapore has enhanced its strategic location by giving companies significant tax breaks for periods of 
up to ten years, and the Chinese regions have invested heavily in infrastructure to facilitate export-
oriented production. The regions with most inward FDI are all situated on the East coast of China 
around ports or close to existing agglomerations such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Local governments 
have competed for FDI by preferential policies, simplification of bureaucracy, land-use concessions 
and tax holidays (Zhao and Zhang, 2007). All these factors lower the cost of doing business.  
But why are not all cities able to tap into the flows of trade made possible by globalization? 
Not all fast urbanizing regions of Africa have enjoyed export-led growth even if they are not 
landlocked and have reasonably good institutions. One reason for this disappointing African 
performance may be that the costs of agglomeration exceed the benefits. The government-led 
designation of certain areas for inward FDI in Asia may also have boosted increasing returns to scale, 
                                                 
2 However, the recent growth of China and India has created massive demand for resources and renewed interest 
in Africa, which has many resource abundant countries. Resource-related FDI towards Africa may now originate 
mostly from these fast growing countries.    15
because it directed FDI to a few locations with clearly defined benefits. This policy crucially depends 
on a strong and dedicated government. Corruption and political strife and instability may make these 
policies much more difficult to implement in other regions and make it more difficult to persuade 
foreign companies to invest. A second explanation may be that cities in general only provide more 
benefits than costs if they are not too large to begin with. We explore this in the next two sections. 
 
II.3. Increasing Returns, Congestion, Migration and City Formation 
 
Although urbanization in developing countries, such as in much of Asia, can be viewed as an essential 
part of globalization, it often goes together with problems of congestion, pollution and slums. In 
African and sometimes also in Latin America, urbanization has often not yielded the growth and 
employment advantages possible of urbanization (see our discussion of Tables 5-10 in Section III.4). 
Becker and Morrison (1988) already pointed out that rapid urbanization in Africa has by itself not 
kick-started many of the conventional engines of growth. One reason may be that, typically, most 
urbanization is concentrated in one single city, most often a national capital and seat of government. 
There are reasons why this may lead to inefficiencies and even prevent cities from economically 
reaching their potential. Even if there is a levelling global playing field between cities, it need not 
mean that the playing field is levelling inside cities. While ease of international trade has made the 
world smaller (or ‘flatter’), we also see that there are large local spikes: mega-cities have developed 
alongside globalization. 
The degree to which the urban population is concentrated in one city is referred to as primacy 
(Davis and Henderson, 2003). Section I.2 already described the degree of primacy in the less 
developed regions of the world such as Latin America and Africa. It manifests itself in cities of over 
10 million inhabitants, where people live in very high density and often in poor conditions. This would 
not be a problem if infrastructure and labour and housing markets could keep up with the fast pace of 
migration to these cities. London and Paris, for example, are well-functioning cities compared to 
Nairobi, Mumbai and Dhaka, where most people live in slums, work in the informal sector and lack 
even the most basic public infrastructure. Here we discuss why mega-cities can lead to the opposite of 
a level playing field for its inhabitants and how these factors are worse in developing countries. We 
make use of the diagrammatic exposition presented in Duranton (2007), which itself is based on the 
model developed by Black and Henderson (1999). 
Cities everywhere in the world have a natural tendency to be too large, since cities are riddled 
with market imperfections. These imperfections entail both the reasons for cities’ success and very 
existence and the reasons why they are less efficient than theoretically possible. For example, local 
learning spill-overs may not be translated into private wages. Specialist producers are attracted to 
larger cities because there they can find a larger market, but they are not rewarded for increasing the 
choice of inputs. Firms are not compensated for their effects on the efficiency of the local labour   16
market, nor penalized for their effect on land prices. These type of externalities imply that the 
marginal returns for every extra agglomerating worker or firm are usually not the same as the marginal 
returns for the city as a whole. Cumulative causation of the Krugman (1991) variety  leads to 
agglomeration, but may not be beneficial for incumbents even if they are for the new entrant.  
Cities may be attractive for potential migrants, but at the same time may be already too large 
for current inhabitants. Figure 2 illustrates this point. People move to a city in the hope of finding 
work and improving their real wage, as is happening in China today and has caused the rapid 
urbanization in Asia in the last decades. Their benchmark is the expected real wage they can obtain 
outside the city, either in the rural sector if most of the country is still rural or in another city’s wage if 
urbanization has already reached high levels. This corresponds to the flat labour supply curve (see 
panel (c) in Figure 2), that is the reservation wage (i.e., the net rural wage) is independent of the 
destination city’s population size if mobility is perfect. It may slope upwards or even be vertical if 
mobility is restricted or costly. The net wage in the destination city w−H consists of the urban wage 
w(N) offered by firms minus the urban cost of living H(N), both of which are increasing in the city’s 
population N. The urban wage is increasing in the size of the population due to agglomeration effects 
and its overall level depends on productivity-enhancing infrastructure and institutions (panel (a) in 
Figure 2). The urban cost of living is increasing in the size of the population due to congestion costs 
such as commuting, housing and through the latter also consumption costs (see panel (b) in Figure 2). 
Its level depends on, for example, poorly defined property rights which decrease housing investment, 
and the level of public good provision. The graph is also relevant from a firm’s perspective. If we 
think of firms employing one worker each (“worker-firms”), as assumed in the underlying stylized 
model of Black and Henderson (1999), it follows that the cost of doing business (the firm equivalent to 
cost of living for workers) is increasing in the firm-size of the city due to crowding of, for example, 
shared infrastructure.  
The point is that agglomeration forces dominate up to some city size level and increase the net 
urban wage in panel (c), because without them cities would not exist. At some point B cost of living 
forces will come to dominate after which the net urban wage decreases eventually and thus constrains 
the growth of cities. The net wage curve is then bell shaped in the size of the population. A stable 
equilibrium between net urban wages and the reservation wage exists at point C where the net urban 
wage intersects the reservation wage from above. No one will leave the city at that point, because that 
would raise the net urban wage and induce migrants to come back from the countryside. No one would 
join the city either at point C, because the urban cost of living would decrease the net urban wage 
below the reservation wage and induce migration out of the city back to the countryside. This point is 
to the right of the peak in the net urban wage (i.e., at point B). Even if cost-of-living forces become 
stronger than agglomeration forces, we still have that the net urban wage is higher than the outside 
option which induces migration towards the city. At the equilibrium city size C firms and workers are 
indifferent between the crowded city and the country side, which is clearly suboptimal. The other   17
equilibrium to the left of the peak (point A) in net wage is not stable, because every extra migrant to 
the city will raise urban wages more than the cost of living and so agglomeration forces are strong 
enough. Conversely, every migrant leaving the city will reduce urban wages more than the urban cost 
of living, thus inducing even more migration out of the city. Table 5 shows that GDP per capita in 
cities is quite a bit higher than national GDP per capita, especially in developing countries, but these 
figures are not corrected for local (urban) cost of living. Income inequality in developing countries and 
the high share of informal employment makes these estimates moreover imprecise (UN Habitat II 
survey, 1993).  
There exists also a critical minimum city size defined by being large enough for agglomeration 
forces to overcome the outside rural wage and the local cost of living or cost of doing business. In 
terms of Figure 2 the critical minimum city size corresponds to point A. This size can never be reached 
by a single person or firm and requires a coordinated group action. This does not happen 
spontaneously and therefore people tend to cluster in too few cities, which are therefore too large, 
rather than building new cities. In Figure 2 this is depicted by a population size NC, which is larger 
than the optimal size NB. (and, of course, large than the critical  minimum city size). A necessary 
condition for only one equilibrium to exist, at the peak in the net urban wage, is a high enough 
reservation wage. This, however, requires full urbanization and all cities to be of exactly optimal size. 
This would correspond to a fully efficient urban system. More important, it requires that cities outside 
the metropolis reach a certain critical minimum size, for otherwise a train of immigration would never 
be set in motion. This situation is, however, not the reality in developing countries and therefore 
people from the countryside all end up going towards the metropolis. The problem is therefore that the 
metropolis ends up too large from a social point of view with too much congestion, pollution and 
slums. At the same time, the surrounding cities end up too small to attract migrants from rural areas 
and thus do not grow or contract. The policy used by many South-East Asian countries of creating 
several special economic zones (e.g., with more economic freedom and tax breaks) in different 
locations may have overcome the coordination failure by directing FDI to designated areas. Because 
there were several areas for firms to choose from, it created policy competition and increasingly 
favourable terms for foreign firms. Once a critical mass of firms was attracted, the process may have 
taken off from there, but may never have happened without the initial preferential treatment to attract 
several firms at once. These local effects can avoid the curse of oversized mega-cities. It makes a 
balanced urbanization response to globalization possible and could clearly play a big role. 
 
II.4. Over-Sized Cities Induce an Uneven Playing Field 
 
In order to understand the process of too rapid urbanization and globalization better, it is useful to 
consider several policy effects that can cause primacy and increase the size of existing cities beyond 
the efficient size. First, urban bias may result from trade restrictions that favour the domestic   18
manufacturing or services sector. The latter are, typically, urban activities and can artificially raise the 
urban wage rate. The net urban wage increases and consequently the equilibrium city size increases 
also (Krugman and Elizondo, 1996). This urban bias may also arise naturally, because cities tend to be 
located in productivity-enhancing locations (e.g., near access to waterways). Trade liberalization may 
thus highlight the favourable position of such cities. The trade explanation for primacy may be weak if 
primate cities are also those cities with natural advantages that would benefit most from free trade in 
any case (Duranton, 2007). On the other hand, Henderson (2004) argues that urban bias is often 
directed to capital cities designated to be the preferred location for a government-backed national 
industry. Because the opportunity costs are often very high in these mega-cities, these industries tend 
to be non-competitive.  
Second, political favouritism can also lead to primacy (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Nitsch, 2006). 
Autocratic or unstable governments tend to increase primacy; for example, in an effort to direct 
resources to the seat of government in order to ensure local support. If states are too weak to 
redistribute towards the primate city, the political favouritism mechanism may also work through more 
indirect policies. These include subsidized products and exclusively local access to permits, getting 
credit, enforcing contracts, etcetera (World Bank, 2005). The result is a higher local urban wage curve 
and hence a larger city. Davis and Henderson (2003) find that primacy is reduced under a more 
decentralized government structure, because this gives hinterland cities the autonomy needed to 
compete with the primate city. Furthermore, such policy competition may help to reduce corruption 
and its negative effects on FDI inflow. This seems to have happened as a consequence of the 
successful policies of East-Asian countries.  
Third, a dual housing market corresponds to an inefficiency that increases the size of all cities, 
but aggravates the primacy problem. Cities in developing countries can also be characterized by a 
clear distinction between formal housing and slums. Table 6 shows that up to three quarters of Sub-
Saharan African urban inhabitants live in slums. Table 7 indicates that mortality rates in African cities 
are much higher and life expectancy rates are much lower than in cities elsewhere. Literacy and school 
enrolment rates are also much lower in African cities than in cities in other parts of the globe. In 
contrast, economic growth in South-East Asia has clearly helped to turn informal settlements into 
formal housing and to provide basic health care and education for its citizens. Slums are not just a 
reflection of poverty but also a reflection of poorly defined property rights or exclusionary zoning 
(Henderson, 2007). The high cost of finding substitutes for the lack of public services may even make 
squatter settlements expensive, possibly making living too costly. Tables 8 and 9 show that 
infrastructure provision is much lower in informal settlements, which causes households to spend a 
disproportionate share of their income on substitutes. Table 10 lends support to this view as Africa, the 
region with highest shares of informal housing, is the region with highest rent to income shares. A 
dual housing market creates a duality in the urban cost of living, since housing constraints raise the 
cost of living. Duranton (2007) assumes that this happens more so for squatters in small cities, and   19
more so for formal housing in larger cities when rental costs surpass the extra public service 
substitution costs in slums, the latter of which is relatively invariant to city size. Cities therefore have 
two urban cost of living curves which intersect, one for each type of housing. While housing 
constraints were aimed to limit city size (lower net urban wage through higher cost of living for given 
labour supply), they have the effect that cities grow with slums. After the point where formal cost of 
living surpasses slum cost of living, the squatter settlements remain relatively affordable and 
population increases. This assumes, of course, that slum dwellers also benefit from the agglomeration 
effects. This is likely, because the formal and informal employment sectors are often interlinked 
through supply-chain links from individuals to smaller firms to larger firms. Table 10 lends some 
support to the high cost of living in cities in developing countries, because the share of rents in income 
is especially high in these countries.  
An opportunity linked with urbanization is the increase in the share of people with better 
access to finance than can typically be found in the countryside. The snag is, however, that crowding 
occurs easily if duality limits access to those few people with formal employment and formal housing. 
Only these urban residents with collateral have repayment credibility. Slum upgrading and land titles 
are ways to give informal residents collateral which they can use for loans. Except that this is likely to 
induce more migration. Cities which have grown to over-sized proportions without meaningful 
economic growth can thus easily stifle entrepreneurship through its detrimental effect on financing 
opportunities.
3  
Apart from a dual housing market, urbanization is often characterized by dual labour markets, 
which prompted the famous and influential contribution of Harris and Todaro (1970). An artificially 
high (minimum) wage in the urban formal sector above the reservation (rural) wage induces rural-
urban migration. The migration into the cities lowers the net expected urban wage until it hits the 
reservation wage, so that high urban unemployment is an inevitable component of migration induced 
by high urban wages (e.g., due to efficiency wages or trade unions). This is often used as an argument 
to restrict migration. However, from a welfare and efficiency point of view, the problem is not 
migration but wage rigidity (Lall, Selod and Shalizi, 2006; Duranton, 2007).  
 
 
                                                 
3 For example, positive effects of land ownership on access to credit and farm productivity have been 
established. See for example Udry (1999), Reardon et al. (1994) and Binswanger et al. (1995).   20
PART III: WRAPPING UP 
 
III.1. Policies for Balanced Urbanization Under Increasing Globalization 
 
We are now ready to discuss some policy recommendations based on the discussion of part I on 
globalization and outsourcing and of part II on the process of rapid urbanization paying special 
attention to developing countries. Part I suggests that it is much more difficult to identify and predict 
the losers of globalization. The losers are no longer all in one sector or even in one firm, since 
outshoring, offshoring, etcetera nowadays take place task by task. The codifiable and mundane tasks 
are most at risk. It thus does not make sense to have industrial policies directed at specific firms or 
sectors. Even less appropriate are import substitution strategies. Although some of these policies may 
have worked for the Asian Tigers in the fifties and sixties during the first wave of globalization, they 
are inappropriate for the current wave of globalization. It does make sense to design policies directed 
at permanent employment to ensure that the workforce can adapt to a rapidly changing world. The 
point is that it is difficult to predict where the jobs of the future will be, so the government should 
direct its education and re-education policies at development of general skills. Rodrik (1997) argues 
that markets and the state are complementary. Social policies do not necessarily harm the economy 
unlike what is argued by proponents of the 'Washington consensus'. The maintenance of social safety 
nets is not a luxury but an essential ingredient of a market economy – e.g., Boadway et al. (2004) and 
Blanchard and Tirole (2004). Globalization and digitalization produce many benefits, but they also 
make life riskier and more insecure for many people. A reliable welfare state thus contributes to a 
proper functioning of the market economy. Rodrik (1998) shows that countries that are more exposed 
to the risks of international trade have bigger governments, possibly because governments offer social 
insurance to cushion the effects of exposure to external risk.  
De Grauwe and Polan (2002) show that countries that spend most on social security rank 
highest, on average, in the competitiveness leagues of Lausanne's IMD or of the World Economic 
Forum. Causation is thus unlikely to run the other way round, so that the reverse link going from 
strong competitiveness to a stronger economy and more funds for the welfare state is weak. In his 
path-breaking historical cross-country study Lindert (2004) also argues that there is almost no 
evidence of a negative effect of a substantial welfare state on gross domestic product. An important 
reason is that governments become more efficient when distortions resulting from high tax rates are 
substantial. Countries with large welfare states tend to have a more pro-growth and a regressive mix of 
taxes (e.g., high taxes on vices and low taxes on capital income). Another reason is that the 
unemployment caused by generous welfare states are, typically, less productive and thus the harm to 
national income is limited. A more fundamental reason is that the various distortions of the welfare 
state tend to cancel each other out so that the burden of the welfare state is much less than simply   21
adding up all the distortions one at a time. The general picture that emerges from cross-country 
evidence is that 'laisser faire' advocates have something to explain. Part I made clear that globalization 
produces more inequality between incomes of skilled and unskilled workers, so support for growth-
enhancing policies requires a reliable welfare state to produce more equitable outcomes. 
 
The main conclusions of Part II are that globalization and rapid urbanization go hand in hand and that 
many of the mega-cities are too large and have too many slums and congestion problems. Policies are 
thus called for to realize balanced urbanization to ensure development of a variety of cities and avoid 
urban primacy. The prevalence of primacy across developing countries is a sign that many countries 
still have significant market distortions. This creates literally an uneven playing field both between 
and within cities. Most of the causes are only indirectly affected by globalization and beg for better 
local and national policies. However, globalization may provide a strong argument to deal with these 
inefficiencies because the opportunities are sizeable. If smaller cities can be helped to grow towards 
larger cities and primacy can be curtailed, more countries could be induced to participate in the global 
economy. Rodrik’s (2004) cost discovery process can then have a better chance and allow more cities 
to discover their particular comparative advantage and to convince foreign firms to invest.  
One idea for an appropriate policy response is based on the idea that improvement of 
infrastructure between cities within a country and therefore lower transportation costs affects the size 
distribution of cities, along the lines predicted by the New Economic Geography literature (Krugman, 
1991; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Brakman, Garretsen and Marrewijk, 2001; Baldwin et al, 
2003). High transportation costs between cities, as is typical in many developing countries, lead to a 
home bias effect within the country. Manufacturers are locally insulated from import competition, 
which gives them the market power to ask higher prices and pay a higher wage. They sell mostly at 
home, since varieties are expensive to export. An increase in manufacturing leads to a larger local 
market, but also to crowding of sales. The net effect is lower urban wages. The opposing force is 
agglomeration economies, which eventually dominate as the city increases in size. The urban wage 
thus initially declines and later increases with city size. The same happens to the urban cost of living 
curve, because a small city needs to import a lot at high prices whereas a larger city can produce more 
at home at lower prices. However, eventually increased rents will come to dominate in large cities. 
The result is a stable small equilibrium city size, and a stable large city size. A decrease in 
transportation costs makes the urban wage and urban cost of living curves flatter. For firms it can 
mean more competition, but it also generates more opportunity for exports (a larger market). The latter 
makes cost of living in small cities lower. Duranton (2007) suggests that on balance the net urban 
wage increases in small cities. This can induce cities that pass the critical minimum size to grow 
towards large cities.  
Another idea for an appropriate policy response is concerned with developing the stock of 
human capital. Growth of cities, both of existing and new cities, depends on human capital   22
(Henderson, 2003). Growth of cities also depends on the externalities generated by the concentration 
of human capital and by own industry localization economies (specialization). There is no reason to 
believe that the underlying foundations should be different in developing countries. Lall, Selod and 
Shalizi (2006) review recent developing country evidence of the effects of migration on migrants 
themselves, but also on the destination economy (typically a city). The empirical evidence suggests 
that the earnings of migrants is lower upon entry in a developing country’s city, but converges over 
time. This process is faster and starts from a higher level if the migrant is higher educated, which 
indicates that there are returns to education in cities. Networks facilitate the matching process, but can 
also lead to crowding as the local immigrant size from a particular origin region increases. 
Nonetheless, the prospect of better paid employment in urban areas appears to increase the probability 
of educational attainment in rural areas. Furthermore, a significant share of migrants’ wages is 
remitted to the region of origin. Although the departure of rural migrants to the cities can lower rural 
area production in the short run, in the long run the remittances fuel rural yields because part is 
invested locally. There is also evidence that the above effects diminish with distance. On the one hand, 
this can mean that primacy is a large enough pull factor to overcome distance. On the other hand, the 
growth of multiple urban centres can be much more efficient if it can induce more people to get an 
education. It is essential that cities of all sizes encourage the accumulation of human capital. One way 
to aid this process is to increase the business climate that makes acquiring human capital worthwhile. 
Primate cities that float on preferential treatment and corruption hamper the accumulation process, in 
addition to the suboptimal effects on urban wages.  
The various types of imperfections in cities make it hard to label any particular city as being 
too large. We would, however, tentatively make a distinction between countries with high economic 
growth such as China and India fuelled by globalization and other countries with low growth and 
somewhat disconnected from the process of globalization as often seems to be the case in Africa and 
Latin America. Low growth essentially means that many African and some Latin-American cities are 
less able to benefit from globalization than their Asian counterparts. If a flat world means equal 
opportunities then there is clearly a long way to go still, both between and within countries.  
 
III.2. Concluding Remarks 
 
The waves of globalization caused by technological progress have made it possible to move entire 
sectors to low-wage countries and outsource production task by task. From that perspective far-away 
locations are a lot closer than they used to be. This is the international dimension. However, we have 
argued that this coincides with an increased importance for the local dimension: agglomerations and 
cities. Production and people still cluster in a few places, and increasingly in very large and often too 
large cities. Globalization has opened up many opportunities for all cities in the world to discover their 
particular comparative advantage and attract its share of global trade. Thomas Friedman has argued   23
that “In a flat world, everything that can be done, will be done. The only question is: Are you going to 
do it, or is somebody else going to do it to you?”. “Somebody else” is not just anybody and might 
actually be your neighbour in the same city. But this is not a bad thing. The increasing returns 
associated with agglomerations can make everyone more productive provided that they outweigh the 
crowding and negative externalities. Productivity returns increase in the scale of agglomerations and 
give city residents the means to compete on a world scale. This is an argument to curtail urban 
primacy with all its manifest market failures and let the ongoing rapid urbanization create more cities. 
Government policy is crucial for removing the inefficient policies that lead to primacy and directing 
public resources to efficient policies which enhance agglomeration effects, such as education, 
infrastructure and a competitive business climate open to entrepreneurship. Urbanization, provided the 
resulting cities do not become too large and too few, is an essential ingredient to be able to compete in 
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Table 1: Urban population as percentage of total population, by region 
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
World  29.0 32.8 35.9 39.1 43.0 46.7 50.8 55.1 59.9
Africa  14.7 18.7 23.4 27.6 32.0 36.2 40.5 45.3 50.7
Asia  16.8 19.9 22.7 26.3 31.9 37.1 42.5 48.1 54.1
Latin America and  
the Caribbean 
42.0 49.2 57.2 65.1 70.9 75.4 79.1 81.9 84.3
Europe  50.5 56.5 62.6 67.9 70.6 71.7 72.9 75.1 78.3
Northern America  63.9 69.9 73.8 73.9 75.4 79.1 82.1 84.6 86.7
Oceania  62.0 66.6 70.8 71.2 70.3 70.5 71.2 72.3 73.8
Source: United Nations (2006) 
   28
Figure 2: Increasing returns, congestion, migration and city formation 
 
 
Key: N, w and H denote city size, urban wage and urban cost of living, respectively. Points A, B and 
C correspond to the critical minimum city size, optimal city size and too large inefficient city 
size, respectively. At A and C the net urban wage is driven to the reservation (rural) wage. 
Source: Duranton (2007, p. 5)   29
 
Table 2: Population of a country’s largest city as percentage of total urban population 
Average  by  region:  1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Latin America & Caribbean  38.5  38.8  39.6  39.7  39.7  40.1  40.4  40.3 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  33.7 34.9 36.4 36.3 35.7 36.3 37.8 39.5 
East Asia & Pacific  38.0  38.7  39.0  39.5  39.4 38.3 37.0 36.0 
Middle East & North Africa  35.0  34.8 34.1 34.4 34.0 32.3 30.6 29.2 
Western Europe   27.5  27.0 26.5 26.0 25.8 25.5 25.5 25.3 
South  Asia    17.2 16.2 16.9 17.3 17.0 17.7 19.0 21.2 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  20.8  20.5  20.3  20.8  20.5 18.8 17.9 18.6 
North America   13.6  13.6 13.4 12.9 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.4 
Note: peak in bold. Source: Davis and Henderson (2003) 
 
Table 3: Agglomerations with more than 10 million inhabitants 
1950  1975 2000 2005 
Rank City  Pop. 
Mln  Rank City  Pop.
Mln Rank City  Pop. 
Mln  Rank City  Pop.
Mln
1 New  York-Newark 12.3 1 Tokyo  26.6 1 Tokyo  34.4 1 Tokyo  35.2
2 Tokyo  11.3 2 New  York-Newark  15.9 2 Mexico City  18.1  2  Mexico City  19.4
      3 Mexico  City  10.7 3 New  York-Newark 17.8 3  New  York-Newark 18.7
            4 São  Paulo  17.1 4 São  Paulo  18.3
            5 Mumbai  16.1 5 Mumbai  18.2
            6 Shanghai  13.2 6 Delhi  15.0
            7 Kolkata  13.1 7 Shanghai  14.5
            8 Delhi  12.4 8 Kolkata  14.3
            9 Buenos  Aires  11.8 9 Jakarta  13.2
          10 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach-Santa Ana  11.8 10 Buenos  Aires  12.6
            11 Osaka-Kobe  11.2 11 Dhaka  12.4
          12  Jakarta  11.1  12 
Los Angeles-Long 
Beach-Santa Ana  12.3
            13  Rio de Janeiro  10.8  13  Karachi  11.6
            14 Cairo  10.4 14 Rio  de  Janeiro  11.5
            15 Dhaka  10.2 15 Osaka-Kobe  11.3
            16 Moscow  10.1 16 Cairo  11.1
          17  Karachi  10.0  17  Lagos  10.9
          18  Manila  10.0  18  Beijing  10.7
               19  Manila  10.7
               20  Moscow  10.7
Source: United Nations (2006) 
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Table 4: Urban population growth (%) by level of development and city size 
Less Developed 
 Regions 
75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05 Average 
10 mln or more  134.8  50.8 96.4 49.1 39.1 32.5 67.1 
5 to 10 mln  45.4 22.6 -5.9 7.1  25.3 -1.0 15.6 
1 to 5 mln  16.6 19.8 27.5 18.6 16.9 16.8 19.4 
500 000 – 1 mln  14.8 18.5 17.2 16.2 11.2 18.7 16.1 




75-80 80-85 85-90 90-95 95-00 00-05 Average 
10 mln or more  3.9 51.0  5.8 3.4 17.1  3.2 14.1 
5 to 10 mln  3.3 -36.5  17.7  3.9 4.6 29.7  3.8 
1 to 5 mln  14.7  6.3 4.3 7.8 2.1 1.4 6.1 
500 000 – 1 mln  -6.4  8.7 2.1 1.8 1.9 3.4 1.9 
less than 500 000  6.0 4.0 4.5 2.7 1.1 0.7 3.2 
Source: United Nations (2006) 
 
Table 5: Urban and Regional GDP per capita 
Region  GDP per 
Capita  
City product  Informal 
employment 
Africa  $441  $729  54% 
Arab States  $2,752  $3,170  65% 
Asia Pacific  $4,742  $6,182  33% 
HIC  $22,501  $22,103  3% 
LAC  $3,350  $3,226  39% 
Transitional  $2,541  $2,905  21% 
Source: United Nations (2003) 
 
Table 6: percentage urban population living in slums 
Sample average by region:  1990  2001 
Latin America & Caribbean  35.4  31.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  72.3  71.9 
Middle East & North Africa  35.8  32.5 
East Asia  41.1  36.4 
South East Asia  36.8  28.0 
South Asia   63.4  59.0 
Source: United Nations (2003) 
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Table 7: Health and education in cities 




Literacy  Combined 
enrolment 
Africa  14.6%  52.7  58.8%  45.1% 
Arab States  5.7%  68.2  69.1%  57.7% 
Asia-Pacific  4.4%  67.4  82.5%  71.2% 
HIC  0.9%  77.6  97.6%  88.4% 
LAC  3.6%  70.9  82.1%  69.6% 
Transitional  2.4%  67.3  95.2%  79.1% 
Source: United Nations (2003) 
 
Table 8: Connections to infrastructure 
Region  Water
1  Sewerage  Electricity  Telephone  Access to 
 water
1 
Africa  48.4%  30.9%  53.9%  15.5%  73.5% 
Arab States  79.1%  65.9%  91.8%  42.0%  88.0% 
Asia-Pacific  65.9%  58.0%  94.4%  57.1%  94.8% 
HIC  99.6%  99.7%  100.0%  99.5%  99.7% 
LAC  83.7%  63.5%  91.2%  51.7%  89.1% 
Transitional  91.1%  89.6%  99.2%  73.5%  97.3% 
Source: United Nations (2003) 
Note 1: Water connections refers to percentage of households with a piped water connection. Access to water means 
having potable water within 200 metres of the household (e.g., standpipes, wells etc), and includes water connections 
(since most countries presume piped water is potable). 
  
Table 9: Connections to infrastructure - informal settlements 
Region  Water  Sewerage  Electricity  Telephone  Access to 
 water 
Africa  19.1%  7.4%  20.3%  2.9%  40.0% 
Arab States  35.7%  21.5%  35.9%  30.0%  42.7% 
Asia-Pacific  38.3%  7.4%  75.7%  25.4%  89.1% 
LAC  57.9%  30.3%  84.7%  32.0%  66.8% 
Transitional  33.6%  28.8%  60.7%  29.7%  57.5% 
Source: United Nations (2003) 
 
Table 10: Habitat II survey 1993 
  
Region 
House price to 
 income ratio 
House Rent to 
 Income ratio 
Africa  6.9  27.3% 
Arab States  9.7  17.8% 
Asia Pacific  9.4  23.7% 
HIC  4.4  18.9% 
LAC  3.8  20.2% 
Transitional  12.2  4.4% 
Source: United Nations (2003) 
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